We investigate the impact of movements in the real exchange rate on economic growth based on …ve-year average data for a panel of over 150 countries in the post Bretton Woods period. Unlike previous literature, we use external instruments to deal with possible reverse causality from growth to the real exchange rate. Our country-speci…c instruments are (i) global capital ‡ows interacted with individual countries' …nancial openness and (ii) the growth rate of o¢ cial reserves. We …nd that a real appreciation (depreciation) reduces (raises) signi…cantly annual real GDP growth, more than in previous estimates in the literature. However, our results con…rm this e¤ect only for developing countries and for pegs. 
Non-technical summary
This paper takes another look at the effect of the real exchange rate on economic growth per capita from a medium term perspective, which is a question still unsettled in the literature following previous work by Rodrik (2008) and others. Its main contribution to the literature is in the identification strategy based on instrumental variables (IV). We aim at identifying exogenous movements in the real exchange rate, notably movements that are not driven by country-specific growth shocks, such as productivity shocks. We estimate the effect of real exchange rate movements on growth on a large panel of close to 150 countries over a sample of five-year periods from 1970 to 2010.
The paper uncovers three main results:
• Our identification strategy finds a strong and statistically significant positive (negative) effect of real depreciation (appreciation) on real per capita growth over five-year average periods. The effect is visible in developing countries and pegs, and is not significant or wrongly signed in advanced countries and floats.
• The effects appear to be approximately symmetric between appreciations and depreciations, although large depreciations appear to have a stronger impact than large appreciations on average.
• The effects that we estimate through the IV approach are much larger than previous comparable results in the literature.
Our overall conclusion is that the real exchange rate does matter for growth in developing economies, but substantially less so in advanced ones, which confirms and strengthens the conclusions of Rodrik (2008) .
It should also be pointed out that our results suggest that using the exchange rate as a policy lever could be beneficial only in the early stages of economic development, while it becomes irrelevant in the long term as countries become richer. Moreover, it is not evident what type of exchange rate regime a developing country should adopt to maintain a relatively weak exchange rate in order to foster growth. By pegging their currency, for example, countries may temporarily benefit from devaluations but pay a price in terms of slower growth in case of appreciations of the base currency. Our results are therefore more relevant to understand the reasons why governments may pay attention to exchange rates, rather than a prescription for targeting exchange rates in developing countries.
Introduction
Exchange rates and the choice of the exchange rate regime retain a centre stage in the postcrisis environment especially for emerging economies (Klein and Shambaugh 2010; Rose 2011; Ghosh et al. 2014 ). In particular, there is a signi…cant divide between policy-makers and economists regarding the impact of foreign exchange policies on growth. Whereas laymen and politicians are often intimately convinced that a lower exchange rate will spur growth; economists are generally sceptical that the relative price of two currencies may be a fundamental driver of growth over the long-run. For most economists, the exchange rate is an endogenous variable, whose contribution to growth may be di¢ cult to disentangle. As a matter of fact, the question on whether engineering an exchange rate undervaluation helps medium-term growth is still surprisingly unsettled in the literature.
Finding an answer to this question would have far-reaching implications for the design of exchange rate regimes and the international monetary system more broadly.
The key question of this paper is whether maintaining a relatively weak (nominal and real) exchange rate, such as through some form of sterilised intervention, or intervention coupled with capital controls, or any policy which has the same e¤ect as a net subsidy to the tradable sector, impacts on economic growth in a lasting manner. Unlike Ghosh et al. fashion to alleviate the economic costs of these distortions.
One major concern surrounding this analysis is whether the real exchange rate may be treated as an exogenous policy instrument. Country-speci…c shocks, such as productivity shocks, may impact on the real exchange rate leading to reverse causality. The argument is well known and is made forcefully by Woodford (2008) The main purpose and contribution to the literature of our paper is to address the problem of reverse causality between exchange rates and growth by applying instrumental variables estimates. In addition, we provide some robustness analysis of the results by Rodrik (2008) , including observations for the most recent period covering the global …nancial crisis and limiting ourselves to the post Bretton Woods period.
In this paper we follow an instrumental variables approach to try and quantify the e¤ect of exogenous real exchange rate ‡uctuations on economic growth. One key variable in our instrumentation strategy is capital ‡ows. There is a signi…cant degree of evidence in the literature that capital ‡ows are (i) largely driven by global factors 2 and (ii) associated with real appreciation of the currencies of countries receiving (more) capital ‡ows. We argue that a rise in capital ‡ows due to global (push) factors acts, as far as the real exchange rate is concerned, as the mirror image of a policy of sterilised intervention since its main e¤ect is a rise in the real exchange rate irrespective of local fundamentals, in particular country speci…c growth shocks (e.g. country speci…c productivity shocks). As a matter of fact, foreign exchange intervention aiming at maintaining a relatively weak exchange rate is often a reaction to, real or perceived, undue appreciation due to excessive capital in ‡ows and fear of the Dutch disease.
3 Sa et al. (2013) look at the e¤ects, at a business cycle frequency, of capital in ‡ow shocks in a panel VAR. They …nd these shocks to have a signi…cant and positive e¤ect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector, and real residential investment. They also …nd the shock, in line with our intuition, to appreciate the real exchange rate. For this reason, in our growth regressions we control for country-speci…c net capital in ‡ows, to ensure that our instrument does not in ‡uence economic growth through a direct e¤ect via credit availability. Unlike Sa et al. (2013) , however, our perspective is beyond the business cycle frequency and therefore our results are not directly comparable to theirs.
Indeed, we look at low frequency, …ve-year average, data in (mainly) the post Bretton
Woods period, i.e. starting from the early 1970s. This more recent sample period (compared with Rodrik 2008) is in our view more representative of the current con…guration of the international monetary system (also taking into account the much lower capital mobility before the 1970s). With this broad objective in mind, we regress real GDP growth per capita on countries'real exchange rate, controlling for time and country …xed e¤ects, and instrumenting the real exchange rate with a measure of global capital ‡ows interacted with a variable measuring countries'sensitivity to such ‡ows: de jure …nancial openness. We also use the growth rate of o¢ cial reserves (a good proxy for exchange rate interventions during the 5-year period) as an additional instrument and as a robustness check.
The main result of our study is that once we address the simultaneity problem with with changes in global risk. 3 Recent foreign exchange interventions in Brazil and Switzerland have been motivated by the authorities more or less in these terms. Fernandez Arias and Levy Yeyati (2012) also note that "one could interpret leaning-against-appreciation policies during expansions as the countercyclical prudential response to procyclical capital ‡ows and real exchange rates". Lartey (2008) …nds, however, that the Dutch disease can be prevent by ‡oating exchange rates and following a standard in ‡ation targeting strategy. our instrumentation approach we are able to identify a strong and statistically signi…-cant negative e¤ect of real appreciation on real per capita growth over …ve-year average periods. The e¤ect is stronger for developing economies and in countries pegging their currency, while it is not signi…cant in advanced economies and those ‡oating their currency (though especially for the latter it is di¢ cult to say because our instruments are weaker for ‡oating currencies). The e¤ects of the real exchange rate appear to be approximately symmetric between appreciations and depreciations. Another noteworthy result is that, quantitatively, the e¤ects that we estimate through the instrumental variables (IV) approach are signi…cantly larger than previous comparable results in the literature such as Rodrik (2008) and Aghion et al. (2009) . We conclude that the exchange rate does matter for economic growth in developing economies, which broadly con…rms and strengthens the conclusions of Rodrik (2008) .
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides a short literature survey on the nexus between exchange rates and growth, which can also help in understanding our position in the literature. Section 3 describes the data, and Section 4 the empirical model.
Results are in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
Literature on real exchange rates and economic growth
Before moving to the empirical analysis it is useful to review the literature on the nexus between real exchange rates and economic growth, both theoretical and empirical. Eichengreen (2008) o¤ers an excellent review of the debate, including the role of exchange rate regimes and exchange rate volatility. 4 Here, therefore, we focus on more recent studies and those closer to the obejective of this paper.
There is a relatively large body of literature suggesting a correlation between the real exchange rate and GDP growth. As long as productivity is higher in the traded goods sector, countries have an incentive to maintain the relative price of traded goods high 4 Indeed, our paper is also related to the literature on the role of the exchange rate regime for growth (Levy-Yeyati and Sturzengger 2002; see Petreski 2009 for a survey). Recently, Rose (2014) emphasised that the exchange rate regime was not an important determinant of growth during the global …nancial crisis episode. Moreover, our paper is also related to the literature on the role of exchange rates as shock absorbers or sources of shocks (Farrant and Peersman 2006) . enough to make it attractive to shift resources into their production. In Aizenman and Lee (2010), Benigno et al. (2015) and McLeod and Mileva (2011) there are learning by doing e¤ects external to the individual …rm in the traded goods sector, therefore a weak real exchange rate is needed to support the production of tradables. In these models, an exchange rate undervaluation acts like a subsidy to the (more e¢ cient) tradables sector.
In Rodrik (2008) In the literature, the problem of reverse causality between the exchange rate and growth is usually tackled with the use of GMM. To our knowledge, the only exception is the work by Bussiere et al. (2015) who use a propensity score matching approachcontrolling whether real exchange rate appreciations are accompanied by a productivity boom or a surge in capital in ‡ows -to deal with the endogeneity of real exchange rates. They …nd that while growth is boosted in countries experiencing an appreciation together with a productivity boom, it is reduced when accompanied by a surge in capital in ‡ows (though the combined e¤ect of appreciation and capital in ‡ows is statistically insigni…cant). While the main purpose of our paper and theirs is similar, there are several important di¤erences between their work and ours. First, we consider the impact of appreciation from a lower frequency perspective (…ve-year averages), while their focus is on the annual frequency. Our paper therefore speaks to the literature on the role of exchange rates for growth, while the focus of Bussiere et al. is more on the business cycle dimension.
Second, we use instrumental variables, while they use propensity score matching, which are di¤erent methods with their own pros and cons. 6 Third, we look at both exchange rate appreciations and depreciations, while they only investigate appreciation episodes.
Data
Our sample goes from 1970 to 2010 (post Bretton Woods) divided into non-overlapping 5-year periods, where variables are mostly 5-year averages of annual data. We use a large country coverage, as in Rodrik (2008), i.e. up to 150 countries. 5 A few papers focus on the link between real exchange rates and Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth. (2011) …nd that real depreciation raises TFP growth in a panel of 58 developing countries, but the relationship is non-linear: after a certain point, more depreciation leads to slower TFP growth. 6 For example, the propensity score method assumes that all potential confounders are observed and included, while instrumental variables do not make this assumption. On the other hand, instruments may be weak or invalid.
Main variables. Our main dependent variable is per capita GDP growth (PPP GDP from Penn World Tables 7.1, henceforth PWT 7.1). For the real exchange rate, we focus on the bilateral rate with the USD (PPP/XRAT from PWT 7.1) rather than the real e¤ective exchange rate, due to data availability reasons. In the robustness analysis, we also use the real (CPI de ‡ated) e¤ective exchange rate computed by the IMF. A higher level of the exchange rate measures denotes an appreciation of the domestic currency in real terms. In addition, we substitute the real bilateral exchange rate against the US dollar with a simple measure of its overvaluation, measured as the log deviation of the actual rate from equilibrium. As a proxy of the exchange rate fundamental value, similarly to Rodrik (2008), we regress the real exchange rate against the per capita GDP to account for the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect, including country and time-…xed e¤ects.
Instruments. To instrument for the real exchange rate (see next section) we interact world capital ‡ows, the sum of total foreign liabilities from the IMF IFS with measures of countries' sensitivity to them, namely de jure …nancial opennness, proxied by the
Chinn-Ito (2006) index, which is in turn based on the IMF Annual Report on Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. 7 We also use the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves, obtained from the IMF IFS statistics.
Control variables.
We include a number of control variables for economic growth, while we show only the statistically signi…cant ones, namely the level of per capita GDP at the beginning of each …ve-year period (PWT 7.1), in ‡ation (WDI), the saving rate (WDI), and trade openness de…ned as the sum of exports and imports over GDP (PWT 7.1). 8 For the short term interest rate, we use the main central bank policy rate (when available) or short-term market (mainly interbank) interest rates. We also include country-speci…c net capital in ‡ows as a share of GDP, from the IMF IFS statistics. 9 Exchange rate regime. We use the exchange rate regime classi…cation of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) to distinguish between countries with a …xed exchange rate and those 7 We also used alternative measures of sensitivity to capital ‡ows (de facto …nancial openness, and …nancial development proxied by the private credit to GDP ratio) and obtained results that are consistent with those reported. These additional results are not reported for brevity but are available from the authors. 8 We included additional control variables, such as di¤erent measures of education and schooling or government expenditure, but these were not statistically signi…cant. 9 Results using gross in ‡ows are very similar to those with net in ‡ows as controls, re ‡ecting the fact that gross and net in ‡ows are highly positively correlated. ‡oating. Fixed exchange rates include all countries/years in the categories 1 and 2 of the coarse classi…cation of Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2004) , i.e. those with a currency board, a peg or a crawling band narrower than -/+2%. The remaining countries/years are considered as ‡oaters. Notably, according to this criterion, euro area countries are all classi…ed as peggers after 1999.
Advanced economies. We distinguished advanced economies from the rest of the sample using the IMF classi…cation of advanced economies, as reported in the 1970s when our sample begins. The results are robust to the choice of alternative de…nitions. 10 Net foreign currency exposure. We consider separately countries with a positive or negative net foreign currency position, using the updated database of Benetrix et al.
(2015), although we do not report results for brevity. Note that the sample of available observations for the real bilateral exchange rate is twice as large as for the real e¤ective exchange rate.
( Tables 1-2 
The empirical model
Our empirical model is speci…ed as follows:
where y is real GDP growth per capita, RER is the log bilateral real exchange rate against the USD, R is the nominal short term interest rate, and z is a vector of controls (lagged GDP per capita, in ‡ation, saving ratio, trade openness, net capital in ‡ows) that are common in the growth literature. We include the domestic interest rate to control for the fact that domestic monetary policy may in ‡uence the real exchange rate and economic growth. The coe¢ cient of interest in this regression is . To address the problem of reverse causality, we instrument RER using instruments de…ned as follows,
where i;t 1 is a measure of the currency i's vulnerability to global capital ‡ows (F LOW S t ), based on the country's de jure …nancial openness, lagged one period to mitigate the risk of reverse causality. 11 We argue that gyrations in world capital ‡ows should be largely independent of each country's fundamentals, i.e. represent a push factor for most or all countries. 12 They should therefore represent a source of variation in real exchange rates in countries that are more exposed to them, i.e the countries that are more …nancially open at time t. This is the core of our identi…cation approach. One important caveat is that shifts in capital ‡ows may a¤ect economic growth directly, for example by changing credit availability conditions as emphasised for example in Sa et al. (2013) . To the extent that this is the case in practice, this would make the instrument invalid because it would in ‡uence income growth directly. For this reason, in our regressions we also control for net capital in ‡ows. 13 In order to cross check the robustness of the results we also use another instrument, namely the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves, a proxy for countries' exchange rate interventions. The relevance of this instrument is supported by a recent study by Blanchard et al. (2015) who …nd that larger foreign exchange intervention leads to less exchange rate appreciation in response to gross capital in ‡ows.
Note that per capita real GDP growth is expressed in percentages, and the real exchange rate is in logs. Therefore, the coe¢ cient of interest can be interpreted as the e¤ect on average real output growth over a …ve year period resulting from a real appreciation by 100% (a higher value of RER denotes a real appreciation). Also note that we include RER in levels, given that it is clearly stationary at the frequency we use in this paper.
We estimate the model (1) for the whole sample of countries and periods as well as for di¤erent subsets of countries: advanced and developing countries; pegs and ‡oats; and exchange rate appreciations vs. depreciations. 14 11 Our main instrument is therefore a so-called Bartik instrument; see Bartik (1991) . 12 The United States may be an exception and for this reason it is excluded from the sample. 13 Note that in Sa et al. (2013) capital in ‡ow shocks are positive for growth. Here we argue for the opposite channel: a capital in ‡ow shock appreciates the real exchange rate, and we want to test is this appreciation reduces growth. 14 We also split countries according to whether they have negative or positive net foreign asset positions, using the data of Lane and Shambaugh (2010) and Benetrix et al. (2015) (not reported for brevity). It can
Results
Before describing the results in detail, it is useful to give a summary of the main …nd-ings. Our main result is that once we address reverse causality by applying instrumental variables we uncover a strong and statistically signi…cant positive (negative) e¤ect of real depreciation (appreciation) on real per capita growth over …ve-year average periods. The e¤ect is stronger for developing countries (rather than advanced) and for pegs (rather than ‡oats). On the other hand, the e¤ects appear to be approximately symmetric between appreciations and depreciations. Finally, the e¤ects that we estimate through the IV approach are much larger than previous comparable results in the literature. Hence, our conclusion is that the exchange rate does matter for growth, especially in developing economies, which broadly con…rms and strengthens the conclusions of Rodrik (2008). Table 3 reports OLS estimates of equation (1) ( Table 3 here) be expected that, ceteris paribus, countries with a positive net foreign currency position derive valuation gains from a depreciation which may boost their growth rate, for example through wealth e¤ects or due to less binding …nancing constraints. On the contrary, following a depreciation, countries with a negative net foreign currency position experience valuation losses and have to face negative balance sheet e¤ects which could hamper growth. While this is indeed what we …nd in this regression, i.e. the coe¢ cient on the real exchange rate is much larger in countries with a positive net foreign currency position, the e¤ect of the foreign currency position is surprisingly large and deserves further investigation. As far as we are aware, this is the …rst time that the net foreign currency position is found to have a bearing on the growth e¤ects of exchange rate movements, especially at low frequency.
OLS

First stage results
We report our …rst stage regression in Table 4 , where the dependent variable is the real bilateral exchange rate with the US dollar. Our instruments are signi…cant and with the expected sign both individually and when included jointly. An expansion of world capital ‡ows leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate in more …nancially open countries, while an accumulation of foreign exchange reserves depreciates the real exchange rate, in line with our identi…cation story. We also …nd that the initial real per capita level of GDP and net capital in ‡ows are positively associated with a more appreciated real exchange rate.
( Table 4 here)
Baseline IV
Are the results of OLS regressions in Table 3 in ‡uenced by reverse causality? To test this hypothesis, in Table 5 we report our baseline IV results, using the speci…cation that was introduced in Section 4. For the baseline exercise we use both instruments together. In this case, we …nd relatively strong evidence that, for the whole sample, the real exchange rate negatively and signi…cantly a¤ects real per capita GDP growth. The size of the coe¢ cient is large and economically signi…cant. A 10% real depreciation (appreciation) leads to 1% higher (lower) real GDP growth per year in the baseline. The e¤ect is even larger for non-advanced countries (in line with results in Rodrik 2008), where a 10% depreciation (appreciation) leads to a rise (fall) in economic growth by almost 1.5%. The e¤ect for advanced countries is also negative but smaller and not statistically signi…cant.
Note that we test that these coe¢ cients are signi…cant when taking into account the possibility that instruments are weak, using an application of the conditional likelihood ratio test of Moreira (2003) . In all cases but two, the J test does not reject the null of valid instruments at the 10 per cent con…dence level.
We also …nd that the signi…cant impact of the real exchange rate on economic growth only prevails for pegs, but not for ‡oats. Note that if depreciation fosters growth mainly through a reallocation from non-tradables to tradables, then the exchange rate regime should not matter, since this mechanism should be at play irrespective of the source of the exchange rate movement. On the other hand, exchange rates may deviate from fundamentals more in pegs than in ‡oats; notably pegs may entail the possibility of being locked into an overvalued level that hampers growth. It is therefore not implausible that the e¤ect of the real exchange rate on growth is stronger in pegs, at least because we can better observe such e¤ects. Importantly, however, our evidence is stronger for pegs probably just because we have far more pegs than ‡oats in our sample (indeed most smaller countries peg their currency) and our instruments are signi…cantly weaker for ‡oats. 15 Therefore, our evidence on pegs vs. ‡oats should be interpreted with caution.
Finally, note that our results are robust to using the real e¤ective exchange rate as measured by the IMF (column (6)) and a proxy for the real exchange rate overvaluation, based on a simple estimate of the equilibrium value that accounts for the Balassa-Samuelson e¤ect as also done by Rodrik (2008) (column (7)). Results for other variables included in the regression are very similar to the OLS estimates, as expected.
( Table 5 here) Table 6 contains a robustness analysis of the baseline results according to whether countries are advanced or developing, using di¤erent classi…cation methods. Irrespective of the de…nition, we …nd that the e¤ects are stronger and more signi…cant in developing countries, and in particular in developing countries which also peg, in line with Rodrik (2008) .
Robustness
This may suggest that the e¤ect of real exchange rate appreciation or depreciation may re ‡ect the in ‡uence of low productivity growth in the non-tradable sector due to poor institutions, which is more likely to prevail in developing countries.
Further robustness analysis is included in Table 7 , which brings additional insights. In columns (2)- (3), we use only one instrument at the time in exactly identi…ed regressions.
The results are very much in line with the baseline in column (1). Finally, in the last column of the table we test whether our results are driven to a large extent by the global 15 An additional caveat is that any exchange rate classi…cation regime is subject to a signi…cant measurement error (Rose 2011 ). We also run our baseline regression for pegs using only one instrument at the time (not reported for brevity). This is done in order to check if the growth impact of the real exchange rate growth rate is stronger when the growth in foreign reserves is used as an instrument, i.e. when the real exchange rate movement is the result of deliberate policy action. We …nd, however, no major di¤erence in results depending on the instrument used; in fact the growth impact is larger when using the other instrument.
…nancial crisis, i.e. the …ve-year period between 2006 and 2010. When excluding this observation we …nd that the coe¢ cient remains negative and signi…cant, but its size is somewhat reduced compared with the baseline.
In Table 8 we focus on the di¤erence between appreciations and depreciations, i.e. on the possible asymmetry of the relationship. There does not seem to be a signi…cant di¤erence between appreciations and depreciations, though they are borderline statistically signi…cant when included individually and the e¤ect of depreciations is somewhat larger. It is also interesting that the e¤ect seems to be stronger for depreciations in pegging economies rather than appreciations in countries pegging their currency, although in this case results are not statistically signi…cant. In columns (5) and (6) we exclude large depreciations (currency crises) and large appreciations, by trimming the left or the right tail at the 5th percentile of the distribution of real exchange rate log-changes. The exclusion of large depreciations leads to a small reduction in the size (in absolute terms) of the coe¢ cient for the real exchange rate, which instead increases when excluding large appreciations. This suggests that large depreciations are more important than large appreciations for growth. Importantly, our baseline result regarding the impact of the real exchange rate on growth is not driven by outliers, as we show in column (7) where we exclude both large appreciations and large depreciations.
In Table 9 we use two-step system GMM estimates with small sample correction, where the real exchange rate is instrumented, in the …rst di¤erences equation, with its second lag level. We …nd results that are in line with the baseline results qualitatively, but point to a smaller e¤ect of the real exchange rate, around one third of the baseline estimate.
Moreover, in the case of advanced economies, there is a positive relationship between the real exchange rate and growth. The GMM results of Table 9 are close to estimates in previous papers, namely Rodrik (2008) and Aghion et al. (2009) . It is evident that our IV estimates point to a much larger e¤ect of the real exchange rate on growth than estimated via GMM regressions (see Table 10 ). This suggests that lagged explanatory variables may not necessarily be good instruments to deal with reverse causality. Notably, Reed (2015) and Bellemare et al. (2015) show that lag identi…cation depends on the assumption that the unobserved confounding variable is not serially correlated but the lagged endogenous variable is, which is unlikely.
It is plausible that our higher estimates relative to the GMM results are due to the 
Conclusions
In this paper we take another look at the e¤ect of the real exchange rate on economic growth per capita from a medium term perspective, an issue which is still unsettled in the literature. Our main contribution to the literature is in the identi…cation strategy based on instrumental variables. We aim at identifying exogenous movements in the real exchange rate, notably movements that are not driven by country-speci…c growth shocks (for example, productivity shocks). We estimate a large panel of close to 150 countries over a sample of …ve-year periods from 1970 to 2010.
Our main results can be summarised in three points. First, our identi…cation strategy uncovers a strong and statistically signi…cant positive (negative) e¤ect of real depreciation (appreciation) on real per capita growth over …ve-year average periods. Second, the e¤ect is visible in developing countries and pegs, and is not signi…cant or wrongly signed in advanced countries and ‡oats, where our instruments are also weaker. On the other hand, the e¤ects appear to be approximately symmetric between appreciations and depreciations, although large depreciations appear to have a stronger impact than large appreciations on average. Finally, the e¤ects that we estimate through the IV approach are much larger than previous comparable results in the literature, which suggests that our identi…cation leads to sharper results. Hence, our overall conclusion is that the exchange rates does matter for growth in developing economies, but substantially less so in advanced ones, which con…rms and strengthens the conclusions of Rodrik (2008) .
It should be noted that our paper contains a careful empirical analysis of the e¤ects of exogenous changes in the real exchange rate on per capita GDP growth from a medium term perspective, but is subject, like any analysis, to caveats and limitations. Most important, it has relatively little to say on the transmission channels. Future research ECB Working Paper 1921, June 2016may want to focus on disentangling the e¤ect on the most important component of output (e.g. tradables and non-tradables), and to distinguish the contributions of productivity and of production inputs (capital and labour). Such analysis will unavoidably face more data limitations than we do in this paper, but is nevertheless essential to shed some light on the way exchange rates in ‡uence countries'economic performance over time.
Finally, an additional caveat concerns the policy implications of our work. First, the results suggest that using the exchange rate as a policy lever could be bene…cial only in the early stages of economic development, while it becomes irrelevant in the long term Table 1 for a description of the variables. Notes. The table reports Table 1 for a description of the variables. Table 1 for a description of the variables and notes to Table 5 for the methodology and further details. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 per cent level. Notes. The table reports the IV estimates where the real exchange rate is instrumented by two variables: (i) world capital flows multiplied by the de jure (Chinn-Ito) index of capital account liberalisation at time t-1, and (ii) the growth rate of foreign exchange reserves. The sample in column (5) (in column (6)) excludes the observations in the left (right) tail (5 th percentile) of the distribution of real exchange rate log-changes. Finally, in column (7), both tails of the distribution have been excluded from the sample. See Table 1 for a description of the variables and notes to Table 5 for the methodology and further details. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 per cent level. sample correction, treating the real exchange rate as endogenous (instrumented with the second lag level in the first differences equation), the control variables as predetermined (instrumented with the first lag level) and time fixed effects as exogenous. The Hansen test checks the validity of the instruments, under the null hypothesis that the instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term. See Table 1 for a full description of the variables. ***,**,* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 10 per cent level.
